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1.1 Connecting Metaphysics and the Sciences 
 
How to define and identify individuals has been a recurring issue throughout the history of 
philosophy. It was, for example, pointedly studied by Aristotle in his Metaphysics and 
Categories, by Locke in his Essay, and by Leibniz in his New Essays. Most contemporary 
philosophers consider the problem of individuality from a general, metaphysical, point of 
view, as is the case, in particular, of Peter Strawson in his landmark book Individuals: An 
Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (Strawson 1959) and David Wiggins in Sameness and 
Substance (1980) and subsequently in Sameness and Substance Renewed (2001). In sharp 
contrast, the preferred approach in philosophy of science has been to define, in a very focused 
and circumscribed way, the ontological status of certain individuals, most often within a 
specific scientific domain, typically physics (e.g., Saunders 2006, French and Krause 2006, 
Ladyman and Ross 2007, Muller and Seevinck 2009, Caulton and Butterfield 2012, Dorato 
and Morganti 2013, Morganti 2013, French 2014), or biology (e.g., Hull 1978, 1980, 1992, 
Buss 1987, Maynard-Smith and Szathmáry 1995, Michod 1999, Wilson 1999, Gould 2002, 
Wilson 2005, Dupré	   and O’Malley 2007, Godfrey- Smith 2009, Clarke 2010, Pradeu 2012, 
Bouchard and Huneman 2013, Wilson and Barker 2013). Today, many consider that the 
approach used in philosophy of science has been much more precise and globally much more 
fruitful than the purely metaphysical approach, often criticized for being excessively general 
and at odds with “real” science (this view is defended, in particular, in Redhead 1995, 
Maudlin 2007, Ladyman and Ross 2007, Ross, Ladyman, and Kincaid 2013; see also French 
2014). It seems crucial to spell out in detail this conflict between the highly general 
approaches favored by metaphysicians and the much more focused approaches favored by 
philosophers of science, and to determine to what extent this conflict could be overcome. 
 
This volume stemmed from two observations, which can be seen as two reactions to the 
conflicting landscape just described. First, the recent developments in the notion of 
individuals in physics or in biology, fascinating as they are, have remained in most cases 
“regional,” in the sense that very few transversal reflections, offering a meticulous 
comparison between various conceptions of individuality and/or various scientific 
individuation criteria across different sciences, have been done (a recent and stimulating 
exception is French 2014). In an attempt to at least partially fill in this gap, the present 
volume offers a confrontation of philosophers of physics and philosophers of biology on their 
definitions of individuation criteria. Several chapters of the volume are intrinsically 
interdisciplinary, while others rather belong to either philosophy of physics or philosophy of 
biology but at the same time take into account lessons that can be learnt from the other field. 
Second, the advantage of the regionalism that characterizes scientific approaches to 
individuality is, naturally, that it is well focused and precise, insofar as it isolates a relatively 
small field of study, but the difficulty is that too often it lacks ambition compared to the aim 
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of metaphysical approaches, namely to uncover the general conditions for individuating any 
object (e.g., Strawson 1959, Wiggins 2001, Macdonald 2005, Lowe 1989, 2006). To address 
this difficulty, the present volume attempts to articulate the perspective of general 
metaphysics with that of philosophy of physics and philosophy of biology on individuals. 
This confrontation between metaphysics and science should not be a “battlefield” (to use 
Kant’s famous image), in which each side would misunderstand the basic methodology of the 
other; instead, progress will be made only thanks to the work of metaphysicians informed by 
today’s sciences, and philosophers of science who keep in mind metaphysics’ goal to develop 
a unifying and operative notion of the individual. The present volume, in other words, aims at 
clarifying and overcoming the difficulties that hold back the construction of a general 
conception of the individual that would be adequate for both physics and biology, and perhaps 
beyond. 
 
The kind of convergence between metaphysics and science advocated here can be partly 
related to “metaphysics of science,” a label that has recently aroused much enthusiasm in the 
philosophical community (e.g., Mumford and Tugby 2013). Logical empiricists famously 
looked at metaphysics with suspicion, and even suggested that most metaphysical statements 
were meaningless (because they were neither analytic nor synthetic) (see, in particular, 
Carnap 1935). The critique of logical empiricism in the second half of the twentieth century 
led, among other things, to a resurgence of metaphysics in Anglophone philosophy, and to the 
view that there was perhaps no strict and clear-cut boundary between metaphysics and 
science. The 2000s witnessed a burst in “metaphysics of science” with, notably, fascinating 
work about laws, causation, dispositions, natural properties, and natural kinds (see, e.g., 
Kistler 2006, Bird 2007, Chakravartty 2007, and, for an overview, Mumford and Tugby, 
2013). We believe that metaphysics of science as it has been done in the last 15 years or so is 
right in its most fundamental project, which is both very ambitious and legitimate: aiming at 
building a general worldview on the basis of several sciences and, if possible, a worldview 
that would hold for all the sciences (for an explicit claim that such is the fundamental goal of 
metaphysics of science see, again, Mumford and Tugby 2013: 6). The problem is that some 
claims made in metaphysics of science are, according at least to many practitioners of science 
and/or to philosophers who are very close to science itself, excessively general and far from 
“real” science; it is certainly not clear, for instance, that all sciences offer laws, pace a 
majority of metaphysicians of science (it is likely, in particular, that a majority of biologists 
and philosophers of biology would reject the idea that there are biological “laws”). 
 
In contrast with some (though certainly not all) “metaphysicians of science,” when we talk 
about the articulation of metaphysics and science, we have in mind a metaphysics that is well 
informed by actual and present-day science, in a precise and therefore limited way: 
metaphysicians interested in building a scientific metaphysics must put a lot of effort in 
knowing in detail one scientific field, without presupposing the existence of structural 
features of an allegedly general way of doing science that would hold for all the sciences 
(Maudlin 2007, Ladyman and Ross 2007, Ross, Ladyman, and Kincaid 2013, French 2014). 
This investment into science itself is necessary for the construction of a solid scientific 
metaphysics, but it is by no means sufficient: indeed, the sciences do not by themselves offer 
a pertinent and well-articulated metaphysics, which is to say that metaphysics cannot directly 
be read off the sciences, as argued convincingly by Morganti (2013). Philosophers interested 
in science and scientists interested in reflecting on metaphysics need to patiently build this 
scientific metaphysics, using scientific theories and practices, as well as metaphysical 
concepts and approaches, as their main tools. French and McKenzie (2012) have suggested 
that metaphysics should be used as a “toolbox” for the construction of a pertinent and 
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scientifically sound worldview; what we suggest here is that both the sciences and general 
metaphysics should be used as “toolboxes” for the construction of an adequate scientific 
metaphysics. 
 
In accordance, therefore, with the recent “metaphysics of science” trend, we think that 
generality is a very important aim for science and metaphysics. But we are also convinced 
that general claims of a science-based metaphysics have to be patiently constructed, rather 
than being assumed in the first place. For instance, because so many physicists and 
philosophers of physics have cast doubt on the idea of causality, their arguments have to be 
carefully examined before making any claim about the supposedly self-evident view that all 
sciences need the concept of causality and, even more tentatively, a concept of causality that 
would be common to all scientific domains. The strategy followed in this volume is then more 
modest and more progressive than that of many proponents of recent “metaphysics of 
science”: instead of offering from the start a concept of an individual that would hold for all 
the sciences, we try to determine whether or not such a concept can emerge from the actual 
confrontation of two different scientific fields, namely physics and biology. In our view, this 
modest strategy is in fact the only way to reach the aforementioned ambitious aim, that is, the 
construction of a general and scientifically informed worldview. What we need to do, then, is 
to explore the resemblances and differences between the physical and the biological senses of 
the term “individual.” Let us now justify this choice of limiting our inquiry to physics and 
biology, and then explain how the concept of individual is used in physics and in biology, 
respectively. 
 
1.2 The Many Faces of Individuality in the Sciences 
 
The notion of individuality is used extensively, and differently, in many sciences. This 
includes, naturally, physics and biology, as this volume will show in detail. But the notion of 
individuality also plays a critical role, for instance, in economics (e.g., Davis 2010), sociology 
(e.g., Elias 1991), anthropology (e.g., Dumont 1986), and the social sciences in general 
(Rosenberg 1988), as well as in chemistry—where a major aim is to understand how 
individual entities aggregate (for an overview, see Weisberg, Needham, and Hendry 2011). 
Despite this rich diversity, we have decided, in this volume, to focus almost exclusively on 
the physical and the biological sciences. At least two reasons explain this choice. 
 
First, as this volume will make clear, the articulation of the physical and the biological 
discourses on individuality is already extremely complex; by no means would we want to 
suggest by this choice that the physical and the biological approaches are the most complex, 
or the most interesting; we are simply convinced that, to address an extremely complex 
problem, one has to start somewhere, and if possible at a place where it seems clear that 
progress is likely to be made. 
 
Second, the incomparably long and rich traditions in philosophy of physics and philosophy of 
biology have given rise to many debates about the notion of individuality in these fields, and 
it seemed a reasonable strategy to start with, and build on, these previous debates. We hope 
that the present volume will stimulate others to explore other scientific domains, and that 
future work will indeed address the problem of how to understand individuality in those 
scientific fields and, even more importantly, of how to articulate the different conceptions of 
individuality conveyed by these various fields. Opening up some possibilities, this volume, 
here and there, touches upon other scientific fields (Paternotte, for instance, uses the 
evolutionary notion of a collective entity to shed light on how the social sciences 
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conceptualize what a collective being is and how joint action should be understood). 
 
So, what is an individual, and how is this notion used in the sciences? Though there is much 
disagreement among metaphysicians about how to define an individual, most would probably 
agree that an individual is, minimally, an entity that can be singled out and counted, possesses 
acceptably clear-cut boundaries, and shows some identity through time (“persistence”). Every 
aspect of this apparently simple definition deserves to be analyzed—and perhaps put into 
question, as will appear clearly in the contributions of Chauvier and Lowe, in particular. In 
addition, one must address the question of whether or not such an understanding of what an 
individual is could be applicable and useful in today’s sciences. In what follows, we 
tentatively lay the foundations of possible ways to define individuals in physics and in 
biology. Needless to say, the different chapters of this volume will explore in much more 
detail what physics and biology have to say (or don’t have to say) about the notion of an 
individual. 
 
1.3 Individuality in Biology 
 
Not only have philosophers traditionally been interested in determining what a biological 
individual is, but many of them (e.g., Aristotle and Locke) also have used biological 
individuals as paradigmatic individuals, that is, as models to better understand what an 
individual in general is (see Hull 1978, 1992). One important difficulty, though, is that the 
individuation of biological entities is much more complex and surprising than might be 
expected by those having in mind familiar and relatively “big” animals such as mammals 
(Hull 1992), and therefore it is perhaps not entirely certain that biological entities should still 
be viewed as models for the understanding of individuals more generally. In the last decades, 
both biologists and philosophers of biology have suggested finding biological criteria (as 
opposed to common-sense criteria, which lead to what can be called phenomenal 
individuation) for the individuation of biological entities, and this has led to one of the most 
active debates within philosophy of biology (e.g., Hull 1978, 1980, 1992, Buss 1987, 
Maynard-Smith and Szathmáry 1995, Michod 1999, Wilson 1999, Gould 2002, Wilson 2005, 
Okasha 2006, Dupré	   and O’Malley 2007, 2009, Godfrey-Smith 2009, Clarke 2010, Pradeu 
2012, Bouchard and Huneman 2013, Wilson and Barker 2013). In fact, many individuality 
criteria can be used to delineate living things, including physiological, embryological, genetic, 
evolutionary, immunological, and neurological criteria. For the sake of simplicity, two main 
sets of approaches can be distinguished among individuations based on the biological 
sciences: 
 
1. Physiological individuation: this approach grounds biological individuality mainly in the 
numerous biological fields that are interested in the explanation of actual working of 
present-day living entities (those fields include, for instance, much of molecular and 
cellular biology, neurobiology, immunology, etc.). Very often (but certainly not always), 
the main focus in this approach is the organism, seen as a strongly cohesive and unified 
metabolic entity, with mutually dependent components (e.g., Perelman 2000, Pradeu 
2010). 
2. Evolutionary individuation: proponents of this approach consider, behind Hull (1978, 
1992), that the theory of evolution by natural selection is our best tool to say what a 
biological individual is, because evolution is in the background of all biological processes, 
and because the theory of evolution by natural selection is arguably the most powerful and 
comprehensive theory of biology. (On this distinction between physiological and 
evolutionary individuation, see Pradeu 2012; see also Wilson and Barker 2013.) 
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Recent debates over individuality within the domain of philosophy of biology have been 
dominated by evolutionary approaches to individuality. Important contributions have 
concerned biological individuals as units of selection (e.g., Hull 1978, 1980, 1992, Gould 
2002), as results of a “transition in individuality” (for instance from unicellularity to 
multicellularity: e.g., Buss 1987, Maynard-Smith and Szathmáry 1995, Michod 1999, Okasha 
2006), or as “Darwinian individuals,” that is, members of a “Darwinian population,” itself 
defined as a set of entities characterized by variation, fitness differences, and heritability 
(Godfrey-Smith 2009, 2013). Other contributions have paid more attention to physiological 
individuation (e.g., Sober 1991, Mossio and Moreno 2010, Pradeu 2010, 2012; see also Dupré 
and O’Malley 2009, Godfrey-Smith 2013), but they have tended to be less influential than 
evolution-based approaches. 
 
Overall, most philosophers of biology have considered that biological 
Individuality 
• Cannot be grounded in our everyday notion of what an individual is (e.g., Hull 1992) 
• Has to be grounded in biological theories (an idea that is reminiscent of Quine (1948, 
1960), but that can naturally be questioned, as does Chen in this volume, for instance) 
• Is dependent on the question being asked, and, often, on the domain of study 
• Can appear at several levels (it is a “hierarchical” or “multilevel” perspective on 
individuality: e.g., Hull 1980, Gould and Lloyd 1999, Gould 2002) 
• Comes in degrees (e.g., Santelices 1999, Godfrey-Smith 2009) 
 
1.4 Individuality in Physics 
 
In physics, individuals are not an obvious given. There is no straightforward equivalent of the 
organism, for instance. After the rise of relativistic and quantum physics, the belief that the 
world is populated by objects with a sufficiently strong identity to be called “individuals” 
cannot be admitted without demonstration. This question has led to a real debate in physics 
and philosophy of physics, a debate that has focused on exactly the question of whether or not 
it was still possible to talk about physical “individuals.” During this debate, new distinctions 
and definitions were proposed, and new approaches were explored. This brought the 
discussion farther and farther from its original sources, which lay in the metaphysical and 
biological traditions. Indeed, one could even wonder if the current discussion on physical 
individuals is about individuals at all. For example, the kind of individuals discussed in the 
quantum context would probably not be considered as “real individuals” by many 
metaphysicians. But this conclusion, of course, is disputable, in view of the suggestion made 
above that the a priori conceptions often favored by metaphysicians should not necessarily be 
the final word in metaphysics. 
 
In the following, we will mention only a few of the avenues recently discussed in the 
literature. In most researches, a basic distinction is made between problems relating to the 
synchronic and the diachronic identity of individuals. The belief that it is legitimate to 
separate these classes is often founded on the belief that intemporal individuals, this is, 
individuals that do not persist, could exist. And since many, if not most, metaphysical 
conceptions of an individual include, as a necessary condition, persistence in time, it seems 
that philosophers of physics became interested in a new metaphysical concept, something 
different from the concept of individual as such. 
 
Importantly, it is not a general reflection about the temporal dependence of individuals that 
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originally motivated philosophers of physics to explore the possibility of intemporal 
individuals, but mainly permutation arguments involving possibilities equivalence, in other 
words an equivalence between models potentially describing different worlds. For example, if 
we rearrange space-time points in such a way that no empirical consequence follows, do we 
face a new physical situation or just another description of the same situation? The latter 
possibility makes it difficult to sustain that space-time points are individuals, while the former 
leaves this possibility open. But of course space-time points do not persist. If they are 
individuals, they are not temporally extended. One could argue that the individuality of space-
time points explains why the situations after permutation are distinct. In this position, their 
individuality involves some kind of modal aspect that guarantees transworld identity. Many 
similar permutation arguments could be found in the literature, for example, about identical 
particles in quantum and classical physics (Castellani 1998, Brading and Castellani 2003). 
 
It seems legitimate to discuss the possibility that individuals exist only at a certain time, an 
idea that has provided incentives for the bundle theory of physical individuality. In the 
context of this theory, an individual is defined by its properties at a certain time. Usually, a 
contrapositive version of the principle of identity of indiscernibles is invoked: no two distinct 
individuals share all the same individuating properties. “What is an acceptable individuating 
property?” is a difficult question. Should we include relational properties and/or space-time 
locations? If we do, the ontological status of these properties has to be clarified (French and 
Krause 2006), but this task is far from being simple (Earman 1989, Stachel 2002, 2004). An 
empiricist and more modest strategy is also possible (Saunders 2006). Instead of metaphysical 
individuating properties, this strategy consists in promoting the notions of absolute and weak 
discernibility as fundamental identity criteria (see Quine 1976, and Saunders’s chapter in this 
volume). This makes the individuating properties more clearly dependent on our linguistic 
framework. 
 
The bundle theory is not the only philosophical approach framing the debate. The particular 
kind of empiricist motivation (only properties indexed by space-time points are 
metaphysically acceptable), implicit to the bundle theory, is not shared by all. Moreover, one 
could believe that temporal extension is required to be an individual. Fortunately, other 
options are available. One could expand the bundle theory to include properties at different 
space-time locations, for example using genidentitical relations among events to define 
individuals (see Reichenbach 1956, as well as Guay and Pradeu’s chapter in this volume). 
This approach is potentially efficient to sustain a strong diachronic identity criterion but 
seems less useful if ephemeral individuals are considered. Moreover, in this approach, 
quantum particles are generally considered as non-individuals. This position is the “received 
view” in physics’ community. Within physics, the discussion generally stops there. But 
philosophers, for their part, ask for a more precise characterization of the non-individuality 
that is typically the result in quantum physics. Quantum particles are countable. They also are 
weakly discernable. So if they are not individuals, what are they? 
 
In reaction to the above view, a more metaphysically inclined position would be to consider 
individuality as something beyond and above any individual’s properties. Many variants are 
defendable, from haecceitism to bare individuals to systemic properties (Adams 1979, Lewis 
1986, Morganti 2013). The absence of empirical access to the individuating features could be 
seen as a real problem for these positions. But if they manage to shed some light on certain 
ontological puzzles, like the origin of quantum statistics, they could be taken as viable 
metaphysical options (Morganti 2009, 2013). 
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Overall, current philosophers of physics consider physical individuality as at least one of the 
following: 
• Nonexistent 
• A kind of property profile 
• A kind of space-time process 
• Something primitive, beyond any properties 
 
1.5 Building Bridges 
 
Even though spelling out in detail what the notion of an individual means in physics and in 
biology is interesting by itself, the most stimulating task from the point of view defended here 
is to determine how to compare the conceptions of individuality found in physics and in 
biology, and if possible to articulate them into a more integrative framework. Yet this is far 
from being an easy task. At first sight, at least, physics and biology appear to differ very 
significantly in the way they conceptualize individuals and address the problem of individual 
identity through time (a more detailed analysis of these differences can be found in the 
chapter of Guay and Pradeu in this volume): 
 
(1) Parts-whole questions seem crucial in biology. This probably has to do with the fact 
that most, if not all, biological entities appear to be constituted of smaller biological 
entities (as, for example, when one asks to what extent the cells constituting a multicellular 
organism are themselves “individuals”). Parts-whole questions play a less important role in 
physics, where many discussions concern particles situated at a fundamental level, and/or 
“entities” that cannot be easily individuated (as an electromagnetic field, for instance). 
(2) A crucial issue in physics is to determine how to distinguish one particle from several 
other, supposedly “identical,” particles. In contrast, in biology, even individuals that are 
said to be “identical” express, most of the time, some significant differences and, at the 
very least, can usually be distinguished one from the other from a spatial point of view. 
(3) In discussions about synchronic identity in physics, the principle of indiscernibles is 
critical. The same is not true in biology: in everyday practice, at least, biologists often say 
that two living things are “identical” even when they do not share all their properties, in 
particular their position in space. A nice example is that of “clones,” which are often 
described as “identical”—even though many data suggest that clones always express 
differences. (Interestingly, the combination of (2) and (3) suggests that discernibility is 
easier but at the same time considered as less crucial in biology than in physics.) 
(4) Discussions over structuralism are extremely important in physics. Many physicists 
aim at determining what remains invariant under transformations. By contrast, 
structuralism plays a limited role in biology, if any (exceptions include French 2011, 2014, 
as well as French’s and Ladyman’s chapters in this volume). 
 
But do these differences between physics and biology undermine the project of articulating 
these two fields in the hope of building a more unified perspective on individuality? Several 
contributions to this volume suggest that the answer to this question is negative; in other 
words, they show that a fruitful dialogue can be established between physics and biology on 
the individuality issue. In some cases, they defend a general worldview initially grounded in 
physics, and then show how it can be extended to biology (e.g., French explains how ontic 
structural realism and an eliminative attitude toward individual objects can be applied not 
only to physics but also to biology); in other cases, they analyze two fundamental examples, 
one taken from physics and the other from biology, to defend a general approach to scientific 
objects (for instance, Chen uses the case of Bose-Einstein condensates in physics and that of 
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genetic engineering in biology to defend the idea that scientific individuation should be 
grounded in experimental practice rather than in scientific theories); in still other cases, they 
make a point that clearly belongs to one scientific field, but show nonetheless how it can be 
related to a theory or a view belonging to the other field (for instance, Fagan defends an 
“uncertainty principle” with regard to the definition of stem cells, and then, building on 
Saunders and others, she explores the analogy between this principle and the famous 
uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics); finally, some chapters try to demonstrate that a 
common principle of individuation can be applied to both physical and biological cases, and 
that each illuminates the other (for instance, Guay and Pradeu argue that the so-called 
genidentity view sheds light on the individuation through time of both physical and biological 
entities). 
 
But the network of disciplinary interactions to be found in this volume is even more complex 
than that, as it includes, in addition to a dialogue between physics and biology, a dialogue 
between metaphysics and those sciences. Indeed, several chapters show how metaphysical, 
physical, and biological views on individuality have been interacting in intricate and 
fascinating ways. Our metaphysical notions often come from “folk science”— in particular, as 
has been emphasized above, from “folk biology” (e.g., Aristotle, in his Categories, explains 
his metaphysical concept of primary substance by giving the example of “an individual 
horse”). In turn, science often cast doubt on our intuitive concepts of what an individual is, 
and this can probably lead to a transformation of these intuitive concepts, which are, 
therefore, probably much less eternal, immutable, and “a priori” than many metaphysicians 
have thought (a nice example of this complex interplay is the way the notion of an 
immunological individual has been inspired by the “self” concept found in the psychological 
and social sciences, and then has in turn modified our conception of what it means to be a 
human “self” in present-day societies: see, e.g., Tauber 1991, Cohen 2009). Several chapters 
of this volume, among others those of Morganti, Saunders, Haber, and Ereshefsky and 
Pedroso, demonstrate that general metaphysics and the sciences can and should talk to each 
other, and that much gain is to be expected from this dialogue. 
 
1.6 Book Structure 
 
Laying aside chapter 1 (which is the present introduction), this volume is composed of 17 
chapters, organized into three parts. The first part concerns metaphysical and logical 
foundations to individuality. The second part explores puzzles about individuals in a specific 
science, most often biology or physics. Finally, the third part focuses on transversal problems, 
that is, problems that arise at the interface between physics and biology, or at the interface 
between metaphysics on the one hand, and biology and/ or physics on the other hand. 
 
1.6.1 Part I: Metaphysical and Logical Foundations to Individuality 
 
Part I provides a general and wide-ranging perspective about the notion of individual, as the 
contributions gathered in this part explore what an individual is from a metaphysical and 
logical point of view. Therefore, they are situated at the most fundamental, and potentially 
most unifying, level. One possibility would be to consider that approaches of this kind define 
every individual, whatever the domain of inquiry; in that case, they would impose 
delimitations and restrictions on how the sciences, and in particular physics and biology, may 
define the notion of individual. Alternatively, one could consider that these approaches are to 
be built, and constantly modified, on the basis of what current sciences say (and future 
sciences will say)—in which case their objective would be to reflect on current sciences in 
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order to offer an as good as possible (though always precarious) view on what an individual in 
general is. 
 
The aim of the chapters gathered in this part, therefore, is to constitute a wide and unifying 
picture of individuality, one that should be used as a foundation for the development of more 
specific conceptions of individuality, as, for examples, those that different experimental 
sciences could offer. However, it will be apparent in Parts II and III that many philosophers of 
experimental sciences do not in fact use the logical and metaphysical discourses as 
foundations for the ontological investigation of physics and biology: these discourses are 
considered top-down approaches, and therefore concurrent to the bottom-up methodology 
characteristic of philosophy of science. 
 
Chapter 2, written by Stéphane Chauvier, can be seen as a conceptual basis for the rest of the 
volume. Chauvier distinguishes two concepts of an individual: the logical-cognitive concept 
of a discrete particular, and the ontological concept, which applies more stringently to entities 
that exhibit ontological autonomy, formal unity, and qualitative singularity. He then shows 
that ontological individuality matters, in two senses. First, not every particular object of 
thought, even of scientific thought, is a real individual, since what is individuated by us, by 
our way of conceptually dividing the world, is not necessarily individuated in itself. Second, 
not every real being is a real individual or is an individual to the same degree. Thus, 
according to Chauvier, the ontological concept of an individual can be used as a basis for a 
complete division of real beings, by distinguishing individuals and non-individuals 
(aggregates), but also by distinguishing various degrees of individuality and aggregativity. 
 
In chapter 3, Jonathan Lowe (who so sadly died on January 5, 2014, only a few weeks after 
having submitted his contribution for the present volume) argues for the possibility of entities 
that are not individuals. Having claimed that an entity x is an individual just in case (1) x 
determinately counts as one entity, and (2) x has a determinate identity, Lowe shows that it is 
both logically and metaphysically possible for there to be non-individuals, that is, entities 
which fail to satisfy either clause (1) or clause (2)—or both. Lowe then explores the potential 
application of this distinction between individuals and non-individuals within and across the 
sciences, in a spirit of fruitful cooperation (rather than mutual hostility) between analytic 
metaphysics and theoretical science. 
 
In chapter 4, Krause and Arenhart argue for the importance of logical and formal 
considerations in any discussion about individuality. They start with an intuitive definition of 
an individual (as a unity, having identity and being such that it is possible at least in principle 
to discern it from any other individual). But they then show that, when we leave the intuitive 
realm and attempt a logical analysis, we find a cluster of problems that are difficult to 
overcome within standard logico-mathematical apparatuses. They question the intuitive 
notion of an individual in view of recent discussions that arise in quantum theory, and they 
push the discussion to a “logical” view. They characterize individuals by means of invariance 
by automorphisms and, finally, they propose a metaphysics where the notion of identity is 
replaced, for some objects, by a weaker notion of indiscernibility. 
 
1.6.2 Part II: Puzzles about Individuals in Biology and Physics 
 
In Part II, each chapter investigates a particular conception or a particular puzzle about the 
application of the individuality concept to biology or physics. Even though each chapter is 
strongly focused on a specific science, many of them draw parallels between different 
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sciences, or between metaphysics and science. 
 
Let us first discuss the chapters grounded in biology. As emphasized above, Peter Godfrey-
Smith, in recent publications, has suggested the concept of a “Darwinian individual,” 
understood as a member of a “Darwinian population” (Godfrey-Smith 2009, 2013). In chapter 
5, entitled “Individuality and Life Cycles,” Godfrey-Smith shows that many recent 
discussions over biological individuality have focused on spatial aspects of individuality. But, 
he claims, temporal aspects of individuality are as important as spatial aspects. Many familiar 
organisms are “reproducing continuants”: they come into being, persist, and then die. Yet 
some living entities put pressure on this familiar view, and on the traditional conception of 
heredity to which it is associated. Godfrey-Smith analyses several cases of complex life 
cycles, in particular some featuring “alternation of generations” (a process in which entities of 
a kind A make entities of a kind B, which in turn make entities of a kind A—like ferns, for 
instance), and eventually offers a renewed and extended conception of reproduction. 
 
In chapter 6, Marc Ereshefsky and Makmiller Pedroso use the example of biofilms to examine 
Hull’s and Godfrey-Smith’s accounts of biological individuality and to explore the nature of 
individuality more generally. According to Ereshefsky and Pedroso, the case of biofilms 
shows that Godfrey-Smith’s account of biological individuality is too restrictive, while Hull’s 
interactor account is appropriately inclusive. The chapter then augments Hull’s account in 
three ways. First, Hull’s notion of interactor is embedded in a general theory of individuality 
that applies to individuals both in and outside of biology. Second, the sort of interaction 
required of the parts of an individual is explored and elaborated. Third, Hull’s commitment to 
replicator theory is dropped and Griesemer’s account of reproducers is adopted. 
 
In chapter 7, Melinda Fagan considers the biological individuality of stem cells (i.e., 
undifferentiated cells that self-renew and give rise to differentiated cells). She argues that 
stem cells are not biological individuals in the same way as cells of multicellular organisms, 
but at the same time she claims that some stem cells at least are biological individuals in the 
way of multicellular organisms. Her approach sheds light on central concepts and practices of 
stem cell biology, as well as the relation between cell and organismal individuality. The stem 
cell case also exhibits an unexpected parallel with physics, specifically Bohr’s view of 
complementarity. 
 
In chapter 8, Cédric Paternotte develops the analogy between a collective engaged in a joint 
action and biological individuals. He shows first that there exist many definitions of human 
joint action, or of what makes a group similar to an individual, but these definitions do not 
agree and are not directly reducible to each other. Paternotte argues that these definitions 
should at least meet an efficiency constraint: any account of joint action has to justify how it 
reliably leads agents to cooperation. The avenue suggested by Paternotte consists in exploring 
the analogy between definitions of joint action and of biological individuality, because the 
main components for biological individuality have been identified and their relations are 
much better understood than those between the components of human joint action. Paternotte 
concludes that we can import some insights of the biological literature to define what a joint 
action is, and when a group can and should be considered as an individual. 
 
Let us now move to the chapters that focus mainly on physics. In chapter 9, Simon Saunders 
shows that, at a fundamental level, the world is built up from quantum fields, and then asks 
how we pass from this to the objects of the special sciences. In his view, there are two critical 
transitions: one is from indistinguishable to distinguishable things that persist over time—
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individuals—and the other is the transition from quantum to classical or semi-classical 
systems. He argues that the two are interlinked, and that the key method is to pass from a 
description in terms of particles whose only intrinsic attributes are mass, charge, and spin, to 
one in terms of individuals whose intrinsic attributes include stable dynamical properties—
among them, spatial location, as provided by state-collapse, whether effective (as in many-
worlds and pilot-wave theory) or fundamental. Saunders adds that there is also a connection 
with ontological relativity (or Putnam’s paradox): the same method, applied to model theory, 
leads from permutable particulars that have no intrinsic attributes to distinguishable bundles 
of properties. 
 
In chapter 10, James Ladyman discusses the debate about individuality, quantum particles, 
and the principle of the identity of indiscernibles. He argues that if the definability of identity 
is at stake, then the cut does not come between individuals and non-individuals as usually 
defined, but rather between weakly discernible and completely indiscernible entities. If what 
is at stake is the principle that identity must be grounded in qualitative properties, even things 
that are absolutely discernible, in the sense of their being at least one property that one has 
and not the other, may only be so in virtue of relational properties. If individuality can be 
grounded in non-qualitative features of the world, or if a logically thin notion of individuality 
is adopted, then quantum particles may be individuals after all. Ladyman concludes that the 
metaphysically significant notion of individuality apt for quantum particles is that of “real 
pattern.” 
 
In chapter 11, entitled “Minimal Structural Essentialism: Why Physics Doesn’t Care Which is 
Which,” David Glick argues for a trans-structural identity. He starts by noticing that the ways 
in which space-time points and elementary particles are modeled share a curious feature: 
neither seems to specify which basic object has which properties. The aim of Glick’s chapter 
is to explain this. After reviewing several proposals, he argues that objects occupy their place 
in a given relational structure essentially. This view, called “Minimal Structural 
Essentialism,” provides a metaphysical grounding for the physical equivalence of models 
related by permutation. According to this view, space-time points and elemental particles turn 
out to be individuals, albeit of a rather different sort than has traditionally been considered. 
 
In chapter 12, Paavo Pylkkänen, Basil J. Hiley, and Ilkka Pättiniemi start with Ladyman and 
Ross’s view that quantum objects are not individuals (or are at most weakly discernible 
individuals), which constitute the basis of Ladyman and Ross’s defense of “ontic structural 
realism,” according to which relational structures are primary to things. In response, 
Pylkkänen et al. draw attention to a version of quantum theory, namely the Bohm theory, 
according to which particles do have definite trajectories at all times. According to them, this 
view suggests that quantum particles are individuals after all, with position being the property 
in virtue of which particles are always different from one another. However, Pylkkänen et al. 
also admit that the individuals of the Bohm theory are very different from those of classical 
physics, and they resort to structuralist considerations to better understand their nature. 
 
Finally, Christina Conroy, in chapter 13, goes a step further in proposing that, even if we had 
a robust concept of physical individual at a certain time, this individuality would be weakened 
if we took into account Everett’s interpretation of quantum mechanics, for which the world is 
constantly branching. She shows that, when considering persons, one must consider the 
criteria for re-identifying a person over time. She then explains that in the context of the 
metaphysical picture implied by Everettian quantum mechanics—one that includes some type 
of branching structure to the world—problems of diachronic identity arise. This is in fact a 
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Ship of Theseus-type problem. Conroy argues that an answer to the question “With whom 
will I be identical post-branching?” can be found in analogy with a solution proposed by 
Derek Parfit in his “Personal Identity” (1971). She proposes that we use a notion of branch-
relative identity instead of the traditional equivalence relation of identity to solve this 
problem. This chapter thus concludes rich discussions, both in biology and in physics, on how 
individuals can be conceived. 
 
1.6.3 Part III: Beyond Disciplinary Borders 
 
The third part of the book is composed of chapters that explicitly transcend disciplinary 
borders, be they the borders between metaphysics and science, or those between physics and 
biology. 
 
In chapter 14, Matteo Morganti argues for a pluralistic approach to the concept of individual. 
First, he looks at the debate about identity and individuality in non-relativistic quantum 
mechanics and offers a defense of the view according to which identity facts are primitive in 
that domain. Second, his chapter constitutes a contribution to the clarification of the 
relationship between science and metaphysics, in particular with respect to what a proper 
“naturalistic” methodology should and should not be taken to entail as far as the theme of 
individuality is concerned. His guiding idea is that taking identity and individuality facts as 
basic is not necessarily in conflict with naturalism. The overall picture that emerges from 
Morganti’s chapter is that of a “pluralistic” approach, whereby different scientific domains 
and theories are likely to allow, and in fact to ask for, different forms of individuality. 
 
Matt Haber, in chapter 15, raises the issue of the relationship between metaphysical 
mereology and biological debates over the idea that species would be individuals. Haber starts 
with Michael Ghiselin and David Hull’s “individuality thesis,” which famously states that 
biological species are individuals. Philosophers, Haber shows, have often interpreted this 
thesis in a mereological way, species being seen as mereological sums. Yet Haber argues that 
this is a mistake, since biological part/whole relations often violate the axioms of mereology. 
According to Haber, conflating these projects confuses the central issues at stake in both, and 
makes the job of evaluating them extremely difficult. His clarification of this issue helps 
identify the genuine metaphysical implications of the individuality thesis, which serves as an 
exemplar of scientifically informed metaphysics. 
 
In chapter 16, Guay and Pradeu offer a defense of the “genidentity” thesis, first put forward 
by Kurt Lewin (1922), and then by Hans Reichenbach (1956). They show that the original 
notion of genidentity was often imprecise and not easily applicable to real scientific cases. In 
their view, however, a renewed notion of genidentity can be suggested, and this notion can 
shed important light on physical and biological cases. Guay and Pradeu draw lessons from 
physical examples of the genidentity view, and apply them to biological cases, in particular 
cases discussed by David Hull—one of the very few philosophers of science having supported 
explicitly, in recent times, genidentity. In conclusion, they suggest that genidentity could be 
an important argument in defense of a processual worldview. 
 
In chapter 17, Ruey-Lin Chen discusses the experimental realization of individuality—the 
production of individuals posited by scientific theories. Experimental realization refers to the 
processes by which scientists produce new phenomena, properties, entities, or individuals by 
means of experimental techniques and instruments. On this basis, Chen addresses two main 
questions: (1) Is there a conception of individuality in and across experimental sciences? (2) 
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Under what conditions can scientists be said to realize the individuality of an object? By 
examining the creation of Bose-Einstein condensates in experimental physics and the 
modification of genes in genetic engineering, Chen suggests a conception of experimental 
individuality in experimental sciences and identifies three realization conditions that apply to 
these cases, namely manipulation, separation, and maintenance of structural unity. 
 
In the final chapter ( chapter 18), Steven French pleads for the elimination of the notion of 
individual in our scientific ontology. He starts with the observation that an eliminativist view 
of objects in physics has recently been suggested in the context of “ontic structural realism” 
(defended, in particular, by Ladyman and French: for overviews, see Ladyman and Ross 
2007, French 2014). In this chapter, French explores the extent to which eliminativism can be 
articulated and defended in the philosophy of biology. Though the motivations are very 
different in these two sciences, French argues that a range of issues can be identified that pull 
us away from an object-oriented stance. He then suggests that various metaphysical resources 
can be deployed to help assuage concerns regarding such a move, and explores some of its 
consequences for the biological sciences. 
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